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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
----000000000----
MARK T . HAYWOOD, 
Plaintiff 
vs. Case No. 17373 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Defendant 
----000000000----
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
----000000000----
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On December 7, 1979, the claimant filed a request to reopen 
his claim for unemployment benefits with the Industrial Commission. 
On this claim he stated that his last employer was Gibbons & Reed 
and that his last period of employment was from June 4, 1979, to 
October 19, 1979. The evidence, however, indicated that the 
claimant worked for Monroe from October 22, 1979, to December 5, 
1979. 
The claimant received 18 weekly payments in the amount of 
$89.00 each for a total of $1,602. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
on August 21, 1979, the Appeals Referee, Industrial Coromission 
of Utah, Department of Employment Security found: (1) that the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
claimant had voluntarily left his employment with Monroe Without 
good cause; (2) that the claimant had knowingly withheld infor::,• 
concerning the circumstances of his leaving Monroe in order to 
obtain benefits to which he was not entitled; and (3) that the 
claimant had knowingly withheld information concerning his work 
and earnings during the week ending December 8, 1·979. 
On the basis of these findings of fact the appeals 
referee held that the claimant had been overpaid in the amount 
of $3, 204. 
On September 25, 1979, the Appeals Board, Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, upheld 
the decision of the Appeals Referee. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Claimant seeks to have the amount of the "overpayment 
reduced from $3, 204 to $1, 691. In the alternative the claimant 
seeks to have this matter remanded to the appeals referee for 
additional findings of fact. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 13, 1979, the claimant filed a claim for unemployito: 
benefit with the Department of Employment Security. Before 
receiving any benefits he found another job. The claimant worke: 
for Gibbons & Reed from June 4, 1979, until October 19, 1979. 
On October 22, 1979, the claimant obtained employment with Monrc: 
on December 5, 19 79, the claimant walked off his job at 
Monroe. The incident that precipitated his walking off the job 
· ' f 1 to let hi· m leave work early to do was his supervisor s re usa 
some Christmas shopping when he had let other employees leave 
2 
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early, on other occasions, to do their Christmas shopping. The 
testimony also indicated that the claimant was bothered by a 
number of other problems at the job. 
The claimant's testimony also indicated that a refusal 
to work overtime may have been involved but the appeals referee 
did not go into this issue. The claimant testified that he left 
work at 4:30 or 5:00 P.M. and that the supervisor wanted him to 
stay and work on a job that would not start for two or three hours. 
The claimant testified that after cooling down he called 
his supervisor the next morning and asked him whether he wanted 
him to come to work and was told, "No, you walked off the job." 
Exhibit 5, which is a report of work and earning from . 
Monroe, indicates that claimant worked for Monroe on December 3, 
4 and 5, 1979. Exhibit 6, which is a verification of employment 
from Monroe, indicates that the was seperated from Monroe on 
December 6, 1979. 
On December 7, 1979, the claimant filed a request to reopen 
his claim for unemployment benefits. On this claim he stated 
that his last employer was Gibbons & Reed. The claimant also 
filed a claim for the week ending December 8, 1979, on which he 
did not disclose that he had worked during that week. 
The claimant received 18 weekly benefit payments in the 
amount of $89.00 each for a total of $1,602. 
POINT l 
THE APPEALS REFEREE DID NOT MAKE A FINDING OF FACT ON THE 
ISSUE OF HOW MUCH OF THE AMOUNT RECEIVED BY THE CLAIMANT WAS 
RECEIVED BY REASON OF HIS FAILURE TO REPORT A MATERIAL FACT. 
3 
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THIS ISSUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY AN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION. 
Section 35-4-5 (e) provides that " ... each individual founc 1 
in violation of this subsection shall pay to the commission twice! 
the amount received by reason of the false representation or 
statement or failure to report a material fact." 
Thus, in order to assess the claimant twice the 
amount that he received the appeals referee should have found 
first, that he failed to report a material fact, and second, that 
received all 18 payments because of that failure to report a 
material fact. The appeals referee made no finding of fact on 
the latter issue. 
Since the appeals referee made no finding of fact on the 
issue of much of the amount received by the claimant was received 
by reason of the failure to report a material fact we are left 
to speculate at his reason for holding that claimant was overpaid I 
I 
by an amount equal to twice the amount actually paid to him. Pre-
surnably, however, the appeals referee reasoned: (1) that the 
claimant voluntarily left his employment with Monroe; (2) that 
therefore the claimant was ineligible for benefits until he 
had earned an amount equal to at least six time the amount of his I 
weekly benefit; (3) that the claimant did not perform such work; 
(4) that thereofre all of the payments made to the claimant 
were the result of his failure to provide material information. 
4 
! 
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The problem with this logic is that a person who 
voluntarily leaves his employment without good cause is not 
automatically disqualified for any given length of time. He 
is disqualified only until he "performs work in bona fide 
covered services and earned wages for such services equal 
to at least six time the claimants weekly benefit amount." 
(Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953). Thus if 
section 35-4-5(e) and Section 35-4-5(a) are to be read together 
there and if there is no definite period of disqualification 
provided by Section 35-4-5(a) there is obviously an area 
where judicial discretion could be and should be exercised. 
This is especially true since Section 35-4-5(a) displays 
an obvious concern for the equities of the individual situa-
tion. The section provides: "The conunission shall ••• consider 
for the purposes of this act, the reasonableness of the claim-
ants actions and the extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching 
a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is 
contrarv to eguity and good conscience." (Emphasis added). 
THus section 35-4-5(E) is very different from Section 35-4-6(d) 
which is the section considered in Decker v. Industrial Commi-
ssion, 533 P.2d 898 (1975) and Diprizio v. Industrial Connni-
ssion, 572 p. 2d 679 (1977). 
POINT II 
IF SECTION 35-4-5(e), UCA PROVIDES THAT NAY PERSON WHO 
VOLUNTARILY LEAVES WORK WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITHHOLDS THAT INFOR-
MATION FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MUST AUTOMATICALLY REPAY THE 
5 
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I 
I 
I 
COMMISSION AN AMOUNT TWICE THAT RECEIVED BY THE PERSON DUR I 
INr. I 
HIS TERM OF UNEMPLOYMENT THAT SECTION WOULD THEN VIOLATE CLP 
··1 
ANTS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION. I 
It is well established that any legislative act which I 
I 
makes a classification of disclassification which is rational:, 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose satisfies the 
exigencies of equal protection. The question here, however, :. 
whether the legislature singled out fraud concerning the 
reason for a persons leaving work where the person left work 
without good cause for a much harsher punishment than any 
other type of fraud, and, if so, why. 
In the instant case, for example, if the 
heariog "l 
found that the claimant had good cause to leave work the pena;: 
would have been substantially ·1ess harsh. At most he would h:c 
had to repay the cornrnission the amount that he actually recer:· 
plus $89. 00. Why should a harsh penalty hang not on the nat~· 
of the fraud cornrnitted but on the decision as to whether the 
claimant left work without cause. 
Or consider the hypothetical situtaion where the 
claimant leaves work without cause, fails to report that 
material fact to the cornrnission and obtains unemployment bene' 
fits, obtains another job without reporting his work or earni: 
and continues to collect benefits. His fraud would obviously 
greater that that cornrnitted in the present case but because 
he "performed work, work in a bona fide covered service and 
earned wages for such services equal to at least six times t:I 
claimants weekly benefit amoutn" he would have purged the dis· 
I 
5 ( } d h f be subjeC i qualification under Section 35-4- a an t ere ore I 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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to a lesser panalty than he had simply collected benfits without 
obtaining a job. 
It would seem unlikely that the legislature intended 
to impose such a harsh and arbitrary punishment on this one type 
of fraud, that of obtaining benefits by fraud as to the claimant's 
leaving work where the cliarnant left work without cuase, and if the 
legislature did so intend that provision clearly violates the claim-
ant's right to equal protection. 
POINT III 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT THE CLAIMANT LEFT WORK WITHOUT 
GOOD CAUSE. 
The facts show that the claimant walked off the 
job with Monroe after a dispute with his supervisor about whether 
he should be allowed to leave early to go Christmas shopping. 
The claimant testified that after cooling off he called reconsidered 
his action and called his supervisor the next morning and asked 
him whether he wanted him to come for work and was told, "No you 
walked off the job." 
In a simial case, Powers v. Chizek, 285 N.W. 2d501 
(Neb. 1979) the claimant walked off her job before the end of her 
shift after a dispute with her supervisor and failed to report for 
her next shift both without good cause. The court held that this 
did not contitute leaving work voluntarily" within the Unemploy-
ment Security Law." 
The language of the Nebraska statute is very similar 
to the language in the Utah statute. 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Also in Sevastino v. State Board of Review, 240A21 
172 (NJ, 1968) an employee walked off the job after he got into a 
dispute with another employee. When he returned to work the next 
morning, he found that he had been replaced. The court remanded 
the matter for a hearing on the matter of whether claimant quit 
or was voluntarily discharged. In doing so, the Court said: 
"It seems plain ... that the legislature, in adopting the language 
'has left work' in the disqualifications section . . . was undoubted!:! 
mindful of a distinction between quitting employment and being 
discharged. Employees frequently leave work temporarily for 
some fleeting mental irritation or 'in a huff' occasioned byrne 
or more of the furstations attending commercial life,without 
intending to quit. Although such an individual may be said to 
have left work voluntarily and without cause attributable to work, 
thus angageing in conduct which might justify a discharge by the 
employer, nevertheless, such a party may not be said to have' left 
work' in the meaning of having severed his employment with an inte:.: 
not to return. 
In the present case, the referee found that the clairr:": 
quit work on December 5, 1979, but he used the term quit work in 
the sense of "left work" without any finding as to whether the 
claimant intended to sever the employment relationship. The claim· 
statements clearly indicate that he wanted to return to work the [ 
next day but was told not to do so. 1 
Also Exhibit 5 and 6 indicate that claimant worked on·. 
11 
cember 3, 4 and 5, 1979 and that he was separated on December 6, 1 
because he "quit". The fact that he is listed as having quit the I 
· t that he was i day after he walked off the job would seem to indica e 
really fired for having walked off of the job. 
8 
I 
_l 
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POINT TY 
IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIMANT LEFT WORK VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT 
GOOD CAUSE THE APPEALS REFEREE FAILED TO CONSIDER THE WHETHER THE 
CLAIMANTS ACTIONS EVIDENCED A GENUINE ATTACHMENT TO THE LABOR 
MARKET: AND IN FACT THE CLAIMANTS ACTIONS EVIDENCED GENUINE ATTACHEMNT 
TO THE LABOR MARKET. 
Section 35-4-5{a) states "The commission shall consider ••• 
for the purposes of this act, the reasonableness of the claimant's 
actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine con-
tinuing attachemtn to the labor market in reaching a determination of 
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good 
conscience. 
The appeals referee clearly considered only the reasonableness of 
claimants actions in leaving the job at Monroe. He states that: 
"The claimant has not shown that the circumstances were so compelling 
as to leave no alternative but to risk a long period of unemployment 
by leaving work without notice of without prospects of other work." 
Section 35-4-5(a), however, clearly requires that the referee con-
sider the genuineness of the claimants attachment to the job market. 
This provision is obviously aimed at protecting the diligent job 
seeker who, upon finding himself without a job, goes out and gets 
a job that doesn't work out. It would be extremely unfair to tell 
this person that he could quit that job, after finding that he made 
a mistake to take it in the first place, only at the risk of losing 
his eligibiltiy for unemployemnt benefits. Also such a policy would 
tend to discourage people from taking a job. 
In the present case, the referee should have considered the 
claimant's past record of promptly obtaining employment when he found 
himself without a job and the relative shortness of his term of 
employment with Monroe. 
9 
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I This is especially true in view of the harshness of this penalty, I 
Record shows that the claimant filed his original ck' 
for benefits in May 18, 1979, but that he found a job before he 
received any benefits; and that after losing his job with Gibbons 
and Reed He obtained a job with Monroe within three days. rt 
also shows that he worked for Monroe for the relatively short penc' 
of six weeks. 
In view of these facts, the claimants record indica-
ted a genuine attachment to the labor market even if his action 
in leaving his job at Monroe was not "reasonable." 
POINT V 
THE FACTS IN THE RECORD DO NOT SUPPORT THE APPEALS 
REFEREES FINDING THAT THE CLAIMANT KNOWINGLY WITHELD MATERIAL 
INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS VOLUNTARILY LEAVING AT MONROC. 
The fact in the reocrd show only that the claimant 
knowingly withheld the information that he had been employed by 
Monroe. There is nothe in the record that indicates that any ques-
tions were asked of the claimant concerning the reasons for 
his quitting Monroe or that he withheld information on that issue. 
The referee seems to have based his decisions on 
this issue on the alleged fact that the Unemployment Insurance 
Handbook explained that unemployment benefits may be denied to 
a claimant hwo voluntarily left work without good cause. This 
document was not introduced into evidence; the claimant received 
it 6 months prior to the time that he filed the claim; he testi-
fied that he did not read it; and bhe mere fact that a person 
might lose his unemployment benefits if he leaves work voluntarilY 
does not without more, necessarity inform a person that he must 
10 
_j 
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disclose the circumstances of his leaving work. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeals referee erred in holding (1) that the claimant 
voluntarily left work without good cause; (2) that claimant 
knowingly withheld information concerning the circumstances of his 
leaving his employment at Monroe; (3) That person who leaves work 
without cause an~ withholds that information from the commission 
must automatically repay the commission a sum equal to twice the 
amount paid to the claimant. The Court should reduce the amount 
of overpayment to $1602.00 which is the amount actually paid to claim-
ant plus $89.00 which is the amount obtainedbythe fraud concerning his 
earnings during the week ending December 8, 1979. In the alterna-
tive this matter should be remanded for additional findings of 
fact with instructions to: (1) Consider the claimants work record 
and the length of his employment with Monroe and the questions of 
whether he intended to sever his employment with Monroe when he 
walked off the job in deterrning whether he left his employment 
without cause and (2) that the appeals referee should exercise judicial 
discretion and consider whether the penalty to be assessed would be 
inequitable and contrary to good consience in determining what 
amount of the benefits paid to the claimant were obtained by fraud. 
DATED this 17th day of June, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
"RAY S. STODDARD 
1600 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
11 
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MARK T. HAYWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 17372 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section 
35-4-10( i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial review of a decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which affirmed the decision of an 
Appeal Referee which denied benefits to the Plaintiff, (hereinafter referred to as claimant), 
effective December 2, 1979, and continuing until he has earned wages equal to six times his 
weekly benefit amount, pursuant to Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended ( 1979 Pocket Supplement), on the grounds the claimant voluntarily left work without 
good cause; and also denied benefits to the claimant for the weeks ended December 8, 1979, 
through April 5, 1980, and for 49 additional weeks beginning May 25, 1980, and ending May 2, 
1981, pursuant to Section 35-4-5(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (1979 Pocket 
Supplement), on the grounds the claimant knowingly withheld material information with 
regard to work and earnings and voluntarily quit to receive benefits to which he was not 
entitled. 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
The claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits and assessed an 
overpayment of $3,204.00 pursuant to Sections 35-4-5(a) and 35-4-5(e), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, (1979 Pocket Supplement), by decision of a Department Representative, 
dated May 21, 1980. Claimant appealed the decision which was affirmed by an Appeal Referee 
in decision no. 80-A-2081, dated August 21, 1980. Upon further appeal the decision of the 
Appeal Referee was affirmed by the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah in 
case no. 80-A-2081, 80-BR-264, dated September 25, 1980, and issued October 7, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Claimant seeks reduction of the overpayment affirmed by the Board of Review 
from $3,204 to $1,691 or, in the alternative, remand to the Appeal Referee to make additional 
findings of fact. Defendant seeks affirmance of the decision of the Board of Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although there are minor inaccuracies in claimant's Statement of Facts, it is substantially 
correct as to the pertinent facts of his work and earnings with and separation from Monroe. 
It should be noted that the claimant did not file for or receive unemployment benefits while 
working for Gibbons and Reed from June 4, 1979, to October 19, 1979, nor while working for 
Monroe from October 22, 1979, until his last week of employment at Monroe. (R.00006, 00012, 
00013) However, during his last week of employment, the week ended December 8, 1979, the 
claimant worked three days, December 3, 4, and 5, and earned $183.30. R.00033 He separated 
under the circumstances outlined in Plaintiff's Brief, Statement of Facts, page3. When claimant 
sought to reopen his clalm for benefits during the week ended December 8, 1979, he failed to 
report his work and earnings for that week or that he had worked at all for Monroe. Plaintiff's 
Brief, page 3, R.00012, 00019. Claimant also failed to report his earnings of $183.30 on his claim 
for the week ended December 8, 1979; indeed, he certified "None" on the claim form in the 
place where it calls for Total Gross Earnings. R.00035 He also certified that he had not refused 
work during the week. R.00035 
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ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM 
THE COMMISSION FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established. Section 
35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part: 
In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings of the Commission and the 
Board of Review as to the facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and the 
jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of law. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission and the Board 
of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be disturbed. Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 
U.2d 131,477 P.2d587 (1970). A reversal of an order of the Department denying compensation 
can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the determination and the 
facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the Department's denial was 
clearly capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable. Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. 
Department of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d987 (1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 U. 
2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 45 (1966). This Court stated in Members oflron Workers Union of Provo v. 
Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 242, 248; 139 P. 2d 208, 211, (1943), that: 
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain the findings and decision of the 
Industrial Commission, this Court may not set aside the decision even though on a 
review of the record we might well have reached a different result 
This Court has adhered to the same standard of review in cases involving violation of 
Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act. Decker v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Department of Employment Security, Utah, 533 P. 2d 898 (1975); Whitcome v. 
Department of Employment Security, Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 564 P. 2d 1116 
(1977). 
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POINT II 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE CLAIMANT 
INTENTIONALLY WITHHELD INFORMATION OF HIS WORK AND EARNINGS FOR 
THE WEEK ENDED DECEMBER 8, 1979, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BENEFITS TO 
WHICH HE WAS NOT ENTITLED. 
Section 35-4-5(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (1979 Pocket Supplement) 
provides as follows: 
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(e) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a false 
statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to obtain any 
benefit under the provisions of this act, and an additional 13 weeks for the last week 
the statement or representation was made or fact withheld and six weeks for each 
week thereafter; such additional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks. The additional period 
shall commence on the Sunday following the issuance of a determination finding the 
claimant in violation of this subsection. In addition, each individual found in violation 
of this subsection shall pay to the commission twice the amount received by reason of 
the false represnetation or statement or failure to report a material fact. This amount 
shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in the manner provided in section 34-4-17 
(c) and (e). A claimant shall be ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit if 
any amount owed under this subsection remains unpaid. One-half of the amount 
recovered in each case shall be repaid to the unemployment compensation fund, 
pursuant to section 35-6-5 (d), and the balance shall be regarded as any other penalty 
under this act. 
Determinations under this subsection shall be made only upon a sworn written 
admission of the claimant or after due notice and recorded hearing. If a claimant 
waives the recorded hearing a determination shall be made based upon all the facts 
which the commission, exercising due diligence, has obained. Determinations by the 
commission shall be appealable in the manner provided by this act for appeals from 
other benefit determinations. 
The evidence of record in this matter is clear and convincing. The claimant worked at least 
two days (R.00021) and earned $183.30 (R.00033) during the week ended December 8, 1979. 
Despite the knowledge of his work and earnings claimant certified on his claim for that week 
that his total gross earnings were "None." R.00035 Claimant's testimony at R.00020 that he 
thought he was filling out a claim for the following week is clearly without merit in view of the 
week-ending date prominently displayed on the claim card and also the fact that he signed the 
claim prior to the conclusion of the following week. R.00035 This Court has previously stated 
that intention to defraud is inherent in the claim itself when such claim contains false 
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statements and fails to set forth material information required by statute.Martinez v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 576 P. 2d 1295 (1978). The filing of such a claim is in and of itself a 
manifestation of intent to defraud. Mineer v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Utah, 572 P. 2d 1364 (1977). The claimant offered no other explanation for his false claim; 
however, the record shows the claimant to have been evasive whenever the Appeal Referee 
inquired into the claimant's understanding of his responsibilities when filing for unemployment 
insurance benefits. (See R. 00019, 00020, 00021, 00025, 00026) 
Claimant apparently does not dispute the finding of fraud with respect to his failure to 
report work and earnings for the week ended December 8, 1979. (See Plaintiff's Brief, pages 2 
and 11 ). The issues thus before the Court are: (1) did the claimant voluntarily quit work without 
good cause under the terms of Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (1979 Pocket 
Supplement); and, (2) if so, did the claimant intentionally withhold the material information of 
his quit in order to obtain unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled. 
POINT Ill 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANT VOLUN-
TARILY LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE. 
Claimant contends that he did not intend to quit his job, but rather, that he walked off the 
jobsite, after working a full eight hours, because of a dispute with his supervisor, intending to 
return to work the next day. Plaintiff's Brief, page 7, R. 00009, 00010, 00024. However, the 
decision of the Commission that claimant voluntarily quit his job is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. At several points in the hearing before the Appeal Referee claimant 
referred to his termination as a quit: 
Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
And they also reported that you earned during the week of 
December 2nd to the 8th of '79 a $183.30. Did you work for Monroe 
during the week of December 2nd to the 8th of '79? 
Well, I worked for them, but I don't know when-I don't know when 
I quit. R.00018 
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Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
Mr. Haywood: 
Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
Well, I don't have the answer. What I'm asking you, really; if you 
feel like it's faulty, I would do that. If you agree that this is correct, 
I'll just-
Well, I-the thing is, it's been so long ago, I don't even remember 
exactly when I quit. I know it was right before Christmas. R.00019 
Well, I think that's wrong, because I remember going to work 
Monday-on a Monday, and I think it was-okay, Monday-let's 
see-no, it was a Tuesday, and I was upset, so I called-I left the 
job is what I did. I got mad and I left the job. 
Did you give them notice that you were quitting? 
No, they don't give me notice that they are going to fire me. 
Okay. I'm just suggesting-
No, I didn't give them notice. See, it was a-I'd had personal 
conflict with the boss there, and there was a lot of things that were 
happening on that job that I didn't-well, it wasn't the way he ran it, 
it was just that the job was very unsafe, and just one day I was 
thinking about it, and I had words with him and he just wouldn't 
talk to me, so I just got in my car and left. R.000021 
The claimant's testimony that he quit his job is also supported by the claimant's appeal to 
the Board of Review wherein he stated: 
I testified that I left Monroe becaues the job was unsafe. I also testified how the 
foreman was only interested in getting the job done no matter how many safety 
precautions that he might elect to overlook. The events the night that I left were the 
last draw as far as that Job was concemed.(Emphasis added.) R.00009, 00010 
The events of that night, when the claimant left work, were explained by him to the Appeal 
Referee in the following manner: 
Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
I mean, what happened-did you walk off the job? Did you tell 
them you were quitting? What happened? 
Oh, no. Not then, no. It wasn't until later. It wasn't until several days 
later. And I want to ask him-I think what I wanted to do that night 
was to go shopping, Christmas shopping, or something. And, you 
know-well, he said, 'I got to pour this one bed.' 
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Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
You know, and they wasn't going to pour for about three hours. 
They had plenty of people, and he just, you know, he didn't stand 
there and explain to me or nothing. He just said, 'No, you got to 
pour the bed,' and he turned around and walked off ... 
Okay. What happened to cause you to quit your job? 
Well, I just-when he did that-when he told me, you know, 'you 
got to pour that bed,' and it was about 4:30 or 5:00 o'clock in the 
afternoon, and I just-everything hit me at once,•nd I decided that 
the Job wasn't worth It. It wasn't worth the problems they were 
having, you know, with doing things in a haphazard manner and 
putting up with a man who didn't care about nobody but himself. 
(Emphasis added) R.00023, 00024 
In the face of such evidence the Appeal Referee and Board of Review correctly rejected the 
claimant's later self-serving testimony (R.00024) and subsequent contention (Plaintiff's Brief, 
pages 7-8) that he did not intend to quit. 
Claimant refers in his Brief to two cases from other jurisdictions concerning voluntary 
quits: Powers v. Chizel, 204 Neb. 759, 285 N. W. 2d501 (1979); and Savastano v. State Board of 
Review, 99 N. J. Super. 397, 240 A. 2d 172 ( 1968). Defendant agrees with the principle for which 
these cases stand: that an employee who leaves work temporarily for some fleeting physical or 
mental irritation may not intend to sever his employment relationship. The Nebraska Supreme 
Court in Powers stated that there must be additional evidence indicating the claimant's intent 
to quit before a disqualification would be in order when a claimant simply walks off the job. 285 
N. W. 2d, at page 504. Although the facts cited by the Court in Powers suggest that the 
conclusion of the Court was erroneous, it is apparent from the record in the instant case that 
such additional evidence is ample, as already recited herein. Claimant's contention that his 
Phone call to the employer the next day evidences his lack of intent to quit is without merit. Had 
the claimant intended to return to work, it is logical that he would have reported on the jobsite at 
starting time rather than merely calling. 
The claimant's specific testimony concerning his intent, although basically vague and 
evasive, suggests that he later changed his mind after walking off the job. 
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Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
When you left the job that evening, were you under the impression 
that you quit your job? 
No. I don't know what was going through my mind. All I know 11 
that 10:00or11:00 o'clock that night, I 1terted thinking, you know, 
that I did-because I we1 med ... (Emphasis added) R.00024 
Although the above obviously self-serving testimony implies that the claimant did not intend to 
sever his employment relationship, it is inconsistent with claimant's many statements that he 
quit or that he decided" ... the job wasn't worth it." In view of the entire record in this matter the 
commission properly concluded that the claimant quit his job. 
One final matter concerning the claimant's quit requires comment. Although the claimant 
testified he quit because of alleged unsafe working conditions, there is no evidence that he 
made any attempt to have management correct the problems or that he reported the problems 
to OSHA. This Court has previously held that an employee with grievances must indicate an 
effort to work out the problems of which he complains, unless he can demonstrate that such 
efforts would be futile. Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 
567 P. 2d 626 (1977) 
POINT IV 
THE CLAIMANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS BASED ON CONSID-
ERATIONS OF EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE 
Claimant contends that even if his action in leaving work at Monroe was not "reasonable," 
the Appeal Referee should have considered the evidence of the claimant's genuine attachment 
to the labor market. Plaintiff's Brief, page 10. 
In considering whether a denial of benefits would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience, the legislature provided three guidelines: (1) that the allowance of benefits in such 
cases would be consistent with the purposes of the Employment Security Act; (2) that the 
claimant's decision to quit work was reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) that the 
claimant's actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market. By use of the 
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word "and," it appears that the legislature intended these three requirements to be read in the 
conjunctive, for only by so doing can both purposes of unemployment insurance be 
adequately met. 
It is apparent from the fact that the legislature did not eliminate the "at fault" concept In 
unemployment cases, that the legislature must have intended a melding or blending of that 
concept with the purpose of maintaining purchasing power in the community when an 
individual becomes unemployed by reason of a voluntary quit, but under circumstances that 
demonstrate the reasonableness of the claimant's decision to quit and also his genuine 
continuing attachment to the labor market. This exception to the disqualification, however, 
should not be construed too broadly so as to do damage to the long-standing principle that the 
claimant's actions must be motivated by circumstances or conditions beyond his control. The 
interpretation of "equity and good conscience" should be consistent with the requirement that 
the unemployment be "caused by external pressures" such as would motivate "a reasonably 
prudent person, exercising ordinary common sense and prudence," to quit work. Denby v. 
Board of Review, Supra. To our knowledge, no other state has attempted to redefine the 
voluntary quit disqualification in this manner. 
The claimant's action in quitting work was not reasonable, as evidenced by his own 
admission that after thinking it over, he called the employer the next day and asked if the 
employer wanted him to report to work. R.00024 Further, the claimant made no effort to 
resolve his differences with the employer prior to quitting. Therefore, claimant has failed to 
show that his quit was motivated by circumstances or conditions beyond his control. Such 
being the case. the claimant has not met all of the requirements established by the legislature 
for application of the principle of equity and good conscience. 
POINT V 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE CLAIMANT 
KNOWINGLY WITHHELD THE MATERIAL INFORMATION OF HIS VOLUNTARY 
QUIT, AND THE DECISION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
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The claimant alleges there is nothing in the record that indicates any questions were asked 
of him concerning the reasons he quit Monroe. The reason no questions concerning Monroe 
were asked when the claimant reopened his claim is obvious-he had concealed the fact of his 
employment and subsequent voluntary quit by not reporting that information to the Depart-
ment of Employment Security when he filed his request for reopening. R.00012, 00019 
The claimant's explanation to the Appeal Referee of why he did not report his employment 
with Monroe was very vague and ambiguous: 
Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
Was there any reason why you didn't list Monroe on that when you 
reopened your claim? 
I don't know why I didn't. 
Did you understand when you signed this certification that you 
were certifying that all the information on the form was correct? 
Well, all I know is that I had a blue slip from Mon-from Gibbons & 
Reed. 
Uh, huh. 
And, to tell you the truth, I don't-I wasn't really up to-you 
know-aware of all the rules and regulations. I never-well, okay, I 
had a blue slip from Snowbird, and I can't remember-I know I had 
to wait awhile, you know, to get the unemployment benefits, but I 
don't-I wasn't aware that, you know-I mean, you have a blue slip 
that says you were laid off, but I don't know why I didn't put-I 
should have put Monroe down there. R.00019 
The claimant further testified that he didn't read the form he was asked to fill out when he 
reopened his claim. 
Referee: 
Mr. Haywood: 
Okay. Did you know mat when you filled Ou'. this torm tl"1at tne form 
was asking you w list all the 1obs you haa 11ad since you filed last? 
I probably didn't read it. Because if 1 had read it, I would have put 1t 
down. 
The claimant's testimony that he filled out a lorm without reading 1t is incredible. At the 
very least, it shows a conscious disregard for his responsibil1t1es when filing for unemp1oyment 
benefits. 
10 
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With respect to the claimant's contention that the Appeal Referee failed to make a specific 
finding of fact as to how much of the overpayment was attributable to the claimant's fraud, it 
should be noted that the primary reason for requiring findings of fact in administrative 
proceedings is to facilitate judicial review. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 455; 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Volume 2, Section 16.02. An examination of the Referee's 
decision shows that he considered all of the weeks for which the claimant filed claims after 
leaving Monroe to have been fraudulent. This conclusion is evident from the fact that the 
Appeal Referee assessed the administrative penalty provided in Section 5(e) of the Act to all 
such weeks. 
Claimant further contends that the assessment of fraud for all weeks claimed after a 
voluntary quit, when a claimant fails to report the quit, is a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution. In support of this contention the claimant argues that the harshness 
of the penalty hangs on whether or not the claimant quit without good cause ratherthan on the 
nature of the fraud. Such is simply not the case. 
Section 5(e) of the Act, as quoted in Point II hereof, provides that a claimant will be 
disqualified for each week with respect to which he fails to report material information. For that 
reason all claimants are required to report their last employment and reason for separation 
therefrom. When such information is reported the issue is adjudicated. If it is determined that 
the claimant quit without good cause, he is disqualified from receiving benefits until he earns 
six times his weekly benefit amount in other employment. When a claimant conceals this 
information and is found eligible for benefits, he receives such benefits by reason of his failure 
to report material information. A claimant who fails to report his employment and separation, 
thinking he had good cause for quitting, cannot later avail himself of the defense of simple 
mistake when he intentionally precluded the Department from making a proper adjudication of 
the issue by reason of his concealment. 
In the instant case the claimant received benefits for 18 weeks, for which he would have 
been ineligible had he not fraudulently concealed the reason for his unemployment. The 5(e) 
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penalty is not assessed because the claimant quit work without good cause, but rather, 
because he intentionally withheld that information and thereby received benefits to which he 
was not entitled. 
The claimant's hypothetical situation wherein an individual quits work without good cause 
and later obtains new work, without reporting either the quit or the new work, is of no value In 
the Instant matter. Although the hypothetical claimant may purge the dlsquallflcation for 
voluntarily quitting, his failure to report the new work while drawing benefits is itself a 
fraudulent act which would subject him to the penalty provided in Section S(e). 
The significance of this issue is that in most cases of fraud covering several weeks, there is 
an act or omission each week, such as in failing to report work and earnings. However, a 
claimant is required to report a voluntary quit only once, that is when he opens or reopens his 
claim for benefits. Each week of benefits received by a claimant after a failure to report his quit 
is directly attributable to his original fraudulent act, and therefore, the fraudulent act is with 
reapect to each such week. 
Defendants concede that an overpayment of $3,204 may be a harsh penalty. However, it is 
consistent with the plain meaning of the words in Section S(e), is directly related to the purpose 
of Section S(e) to encourage honesty in reporting, Millet v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 609 P. 
2d 946, 948 (1980), and does not operate in a discriminatory manner toward any individual. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence in the instant case is clear and convincing that the claimant knowingly 
withheld material information of his work and earnings for the week ended December 8, 1979, 
and his voluntary quit that same week in order to obtain benefits to which he was not entitled. 
The decision of the Board of Review should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ____ day of July, 1981. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, 
Attorney General of Utah 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
K. Allan Zabel 
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